By Dmitry Filipoff
Jeff Vandenengel spoke with CIMSEC about his new e-book, Questioning the Service: Alternatives in Fleet Design for the U.S. Navy. On this e-book, Jeff makes vital contributions to ongoing debates about what sort of fleet the Navy wants and the way it can evolve past its carrier-centric drive design.
On this dialog, Jeff talks in regards to the provider’s liabilities, what alternatives might be seized with a brand new drive construction, and the challenges of transferring past the provider.
Intense debates on the provider have existed for so long as the platform itself. Why write a e-book on questioning the provider, and why now?
Navies’ drive designs are a operate of each the period’s accessible expertise and the fleet’s supposed missions. To query the provider requires an alternate reply, a practical drive construction that may higher execute these missions.
For a lot of the plane provider’s historical past, there was no different that would outperform the platform and its supporting drive construction. Following World Conflict II, the expertise both didn’t exist or was not sturdy sufficient to help different drive buildings, and the provider, regardless of its flaws, repeatedly proved itself the worthy flagship of the fleet. It defended the Pusan Perimeter within the Korean Conflict, launched the vast majority of U.S. sorties within the Vietnam Conflict, and was the proper alternative to steer the U.S. Navy towards the Soviet Union within the Chilly Conflict.
Beginning within the Nineteen Nineties, the expertise probably existed to enhance on the carrier-centric mannequin, however the mission didn’t. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the Folks’s Liberation Military Navy being a weak coastal drive, there have been no credible naval adversaries and so the U.S. Navy shifted its focus to energy projection from uncontested seas, a mission the big nuclear-powered plane provider excels at.
At this time, we’ve got each the expertise and the mission to maneuver previous the carrier-centric fleet. The Navy, partnered with business, has labored exhausting to develop the applied sciences that may allow such a change, together with superior sensors, communications, and missiles. On the similar time, with the rise of the Folks’s Liberation Military Navy (PLAN), there’s a mission demanding a change within the fleet’s construction: sea management and contested energy projection towards a peer adversary.
Subsequently I wrote this e-book to indicate that, with at this time’s expertise and the Navy’s evolving missions, it’s time to query the provider’s centrality to the fleet’s construction. It can stay a key element of that fleet for many years to return, however at this time’s applied sciences present higher choices to perform the Navy’s peacetime and fight missions.
The big nuclear-powered plane provider, the rationale for our Navy’s success for thus a few years, is now holding us again from an ever higher future.
Within the e-book you say that, “The mission has develop into the safety of the provider somewhat than attacking successfully first. But the proper protection for a priceless platform has not often if ever been potential in naval historical past.” Why does this pressure exist between defending the provider and enabling extra of the fleet to tackle offensive roles? How is the carrier-centric mannequin incurring a possibility value in fleet design, and forcing the Navy to concentrate on defending a single level of failure?
The big nuclear-powered plane provider is the one strongest floor warship in all naval historical past, partially as a result of it concentrates an excessive amount of capabilities onto a single ship. When that ship can function as supposed, that focus makes the provider an environment friendly and versatile technique of deterring adversaries and delivering firepower. Nevertheless, if that ship is misplaced, all these spectacular capabilities are misplaced on the similar time.
Extra significantly, the sinking of a Ford- or Nimitz-class provider would probably be catastrophic for the Navy and maybe the nation. The destruction of a $12 billion ship serving as an emblem of American may would have unmatched navy, diplomatic, and political penalties. The casualties might exceed these of earlier momentous Navy losses corresponding to USS Chesapeake, USS Maine, USS Arizona, USS Houston, USS Indianapolis, and USS Thresher—mixed.
To stop that from occurring, the Navy has little choice however to commit nice operational and monetary assets to the ship’s protection, a activity the Navy has excelled at—a U.S. plane provider is the most effective defended ship on the earth. Nevertheless, that protection should function to a special normal than that of each different warship – it should be excellent to keep away from the unthinkable, the lack of an American supercarrier. There’s little naval historical past to counsel we are able to generate such an ideal protection, and tendencies in scouting and weapons expertise point out that activity is just getting tougher. Extra importantly, inside the Navy’s finite assets, each sailor, ship, and greenback targeted on the protection of the plane provider will not be targeted on “attacking successfully first,” which Captain Wayne Hughes confirmed to be the important thing to fight at sea.
For instance, think about the Floor Drive management’s 2015 introduction of the thrilling thought of “Distributed Lethality,” which developed to “Distributed Maritime Operations” at this time. They boldly outlined an initiative to distribute the floor fleet and higher allow all ships to launch their very own assaults, writing that “a shift to the offensive is critical.” Nevertheless, the Navy will all the time be restricted in what number of platforms it might probably distribute for offensive operations when so a lot of them are concentrated for the protection of 11 capital ships. The admirals even not directly acknowledge that limitation within the opening paragraph of their work, writing, “The floor fleet will all the time defend the high-value and mission-essential items; that’s in our core doctrine.”
For many years the centralization of assets and missions on the “high-value and mission-essential” provider was a great factor, because it proved to be an efficient and environment friendly technique of conducting the Navy’s duties. With no credible adversaries at sea, there was little threat of shedding a provider. There was nobody to assault at sea, so there was no cause to concentrate on attacking successfully first.
At this time the state of affairs at sea has clearly modified. To successfully execute the ocean management and contested energy projection missions towards a peer adversary, the fleet should be targeted on attacking successfully first. It can’t do this whereas enormous parts of that fleet are targeted on the protection of 11 ships. To maximise the Navy’s readiness for fight towards our adversaries, it’s vital to maneuver previous the carrier-centric mannequin.
The effectiveness of a fleet drive construction might be weighed by means of quite a few components and concerns. What are your standards for valuing the peacetime utility and wartime fight energy of fleet drive construction?
A fleet ought to be judged by its capacity to execute the Navy’s peacetime and wartime missions, inside present monetary, technological, industrial, operational, and political constraints.
In peacetime, the U.S. Navy is accountable for the “promotion of the nationwide safety pursuits and prosperity of the US,” because the not too long ago amended Title 10 language directs. The Navy’s presence operations, or campaigning, can embody deterring adversaries, reassuring allies, defending commerce, conducting workout routines, and making certain freedom of navigation. We’re seeing the significance and worth of these operations off Israel and within the Crimson Sea proper now.
A part of that analysis should be the amount of platforms within the fleet, as ships can solely be in a single place at a time and, as Secretary of Protection Robert Gates mentioned, “A smaller navy, regardless of how excellent, will be capable to go fewer locations and be capable to do fewer issues.” Nevertheless, merely counting ships tells solely a part of the story, as they aren’t all equal of their capacity to affect the nation’s allies and adversaries. At this time, no single ship can match a Nimitz- or Ford-class plane provider in presence worth—however the appropriate metric is the fleet’s general presence worth, not that of a single ship.
In wartime, the drive construction ought to be evaluated by its capacity to conduct major mission areas corresponding to reconnaissance, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, built-in air and missile protection, and strike warfare, all to achieve sea management and venture energy ashore. Once more, there are each quantitative and qualitative components to that analysis. Numerically, a fleet with extra ships has higher geographic protection, higher distributes its capabilities, is harder to trace, and higher retains its fight energy after struggling losses. Nevertheless, fleet functionality can also be a operate of warship high quality, accounting for his or her sensors, weapons, command and management techniques, survivability, and logistics capabilities. At this time there is no such thing as a single extra highly effective floor warship than a big nuclear-powered plane provider—however there are extra highly effective drive buildings than one centered on these carriers.
You plan an alternate fleet drive construction known as the Flex Fleet. How is that this fleet completely different than the Navy’s present and proposed drive buildings, and the way is it extra aggressive?
The first goal of the hypothetical Flex Fleet is to disprove the argument that we can’t do higher than a fleet centered on the big nuclear-powered plane provider. The Flex Fleet is designed to indicate that it’s operationally, technologically, and financially potential to generate a drive construction that outperforms at this time’s already spectacular fleet. When the Navy decides to maneuver previous the boundaries of a fleet concentrated across the CVN, it might probably absolutely develop a drive construction higher than each the Flex Fleet and at this time’s drive, drawing by itself staffs’ designs, the work of Captain Jeff Kline and his colleagues on the Naval Postgraduate Faculty, and your “Combating DMO” sequence, Dmitry.
The Flex Fleet is designed to assault successfully first, looking for to satisfy Captain Wayne Hughes’ tactical maxim, as described in Fleet Techniques. To do this, it seeks to capitalize on trendy alternatives in fleet design, alternatives that the Navy has made nice progress on however can’t absolutely profit from whereas working inside the confines of the carrier-centric mannequin. The Flex Fleet seeks to embrace the Age of the Missile, community the distributed fleet, and thus diversify the fleet’s kill chains. To do this, it provides missile corvettes, missile arsenal ships, and lightweight carriers, and will increase the variety of deliberate Constellation-class frigates. To pay for that, it stops producing Ford-class carriers, reduces the variety of deliberate new building Arleigh Burke and follow-on DDGs, and cancels plans for conventionally armed Columbia-class SSGNs, as known as for within the Navy’s most up-to-date Thirty-Yr Shipbuilding Plan.
The ensuing Flex Fleet shifts the Navy from an all-capital ship construction to a greater combine of enormous and small platforms. In peacetime, its improved platform numbers and fight credibility means the collective fleet can higher conduct the Navy’s presence operations, even when no single ship in that fleet can match the CVN’s presence worth. In fight, its distributed construction and huge missile stock means it’s higher at discovering the enemy and attacking successfully first, can extra successfully venture energy ashore from contested seas, and is best in a position to survive the inevitable losses of conflict.
The Flex Fleet, working inside present monetary and technological constraints, has extra platforms launching extra weapons from extra vectors and from extra domains than the Navy’s already formidable “program of report” fleet. It’s a fleet targeted on deterring a peer adversary, and if that fails, profitable sea management and projecting energy from contested seas.
The Flex Fleet doesn’t do away utterly with carriers, however somewhat narrows their mission set and distributes their capacities extra broadly into CVL “lightning carriers.” How can these carriers and their roles supply a greater different to the fleet?
With no credible risk at sea, concentrating the fleet’s missions on the CVN is an environment friendly and efficient methodology. Nevertheless, towards a peer adversary, there are specific missions that naval aviation is finest fitted to, and different missions that completely different platforms and weapons can carry out extra successfully.
Consequently, the Flex Fleet seeks to alleviate the burden on at this time’s provider drive and shift a few of its missions to the remainder of the fleet, which would scale back the necessity for CVNs. Shifting to CVLs permits for the usage of an elevated variety of carriers, permits for naval aviation to attain improved geographic unfold and a extra distributed construction, and reduces the fleet-wide impression if one is misplaced.
Make no mistake, a CVL is much less succesful than a CVN. Moreover, if all we do is take the cash for CVNs and purchase an elevated variety of CVLs, it should end in a weaker fleet general. However, as then-Chief of Naval Operations Michael Gilday mentioned in 2020, earlier Pentagon provider research have tried to make an “an apples-to-apples comparability” that “result in fait accompli {that a} smaller provider simply doesn’t compete with a brilliant provider. I feel that’s a false alternative.”
The perfect comparability will not be CVN versus CVL, however fleet versus fleet: the carrier-centric fleet versus an alternate drive construction that advantages from carriers’ many attributes with out being wholly depending on them.
You dive extensively into the current fight historical past and dynamics of the most important warfare areas to grasp how they might have an effect on provider functionality and survivability. What elements and tendencies of the undersea area specifically, particularly submarine and mine functionality, most have an effect on the way forward for the provider?
One of many provider’s biggest attributes is its capacity to remain cell to keep away from concentrating on whereas conducting its tasking. At this time, with over-the-horizon radars, satellite tv for pc networks, cyber penetration instruments, and networked communications, it’s tougher to cover the provider than at any level in its historical past.
However, submarines’ improved quieting and elimination of historic vulnerabilities means undersea scouting is getting harder. For instance, Admiral James Foggo III and Dr. Alaric Fritz wrote in 2016 that trendy Russian submarines are “considerably quieter,” which means “The clear benefit that we loved in antisubmarine warfare throughout the Chilly Conflict is waning.”
The Falklands Conflict demonstrated these diverging tendencies in scouting. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror discovered the Argentinian cruiser ARA Normal Belgrano inside 24 hours of receiving orders to take action. It stalked the ship and her escorts undetected for greater than 24 hours whereas ready for permission to assault, after which destroyed Belgrano and escaped with out the escorts ever figuring out the submarine’s location. Consequently, the Argentinians withdrew their total floor fleet to port for the rest of the conflict. In the one case of a nuclear-powered submarine coming into fight, it discovered and destroyed a single ship with out ever being discovered—and defeated a whole navy within the course of.
That’s not to counsel that floor ships are all of the sudden out of date. Submarines’ poor presence skills, communications, and cargo capability means they can’t carry out lots of the Navy’s missions. Nevertheless, it does point out that we are able to higher capitalize on submarines’ potential whereas shifting away from a fleet construction that requires an ideal—and subsequently unlikely—protection towards the undersea risk.
Mines are simply as problematic. Whereas they’re a risk to all warships, the nation’s low threat tolerance concerning CVNs means even an adversary’s press launch a few supposed minefield could lead on commanders to not commit their strongest ship.
Quite a few constituencies are closely invested in continued provider procurement. What’s going to it take to make a significant course change in fleet drive construction?
There are numerous establishments and people with each the incentive and capacity to affect the Navy’s drive construction selections to guard the provider. This isn’t to argue that they’re doing something improper—they aren’t. That is to argue that their sturdy connections to navy management and Congress provides them the power to have an effect on the Navy’s shipbuilding selections, and their legitimate monetary, political, or organizational motivations give them a cause to exert that affect. Consequently, a change away from the carrier-centric mannequin shall be one of the vital tough evolutions our Navy has ever confronted.
Throughout the navy, shifting away from the big nuclear-powered plane provider would upset the stability of energy between warfare communities, have enormous implications for useful resource selections, prohibit aviators’ major path to flag rank, ultimately finish the complete neighborhood of nuclear-trained Floor Warfare Officers (Nuke-SWOs), and constrain Naval Reactor’s affect to only the submarine drive.
Throughout the protection business, there are total organizations that advocate for CVNs, such because the Plane Service Industrial Base Coalition representing hundreds of firms. There are dozens, if not lots of, of retired flag officers working for these firms. For instance, Huntington Ingalls Industries employs a former Combatant Commander, a former Director of Naval Reactors, a former Naval Air Forces Commander, a former Naval Sea Methods Commander, and a former Chief of Legislative Affairs, all distinguished leaders who previously oversaw the Navy’s financing, manufacturing, or operation of plane carriers, and now work for the only real producer of these carriers.
Lastly, inside Congress, roughly 96 p.c of Senators and roughly two-thirds of Representatives have firms concerned in provider building or upkeep of their district, which means they’ve an excellent cause (constituent jobs) to take care of the fleet’s construction. Will probably be inconceivable to evolve the fleet with out incomes buy-in from throughout the Division of Protection, protection business, and Congress, a tough activity to say the least.
There are many organizations that may resist such a transfer in the event that they select to, however I imagine just one has the information, expertise, and imaginative and prescient to steer it—OPNAV. The change is just too giant, too advanced, and can take too a few years to efficiently accomplish with out the Navy’s uniformed management driving it. As Admiral Sandy Winnefeld mentioned, for the U.S. Navy to remodel its fleet construction, “The actual chief must be a loud, impatient, artistic, brave, and insistent navy management.”
Fortuitously, the Navy has confronted comparable challenges previously and overcome them to enhance itself. There’s the story of obstructionist battleship admirals caught previously main as much as World Conflict II, however that may be a fantasy. In actuality, the Navy made nice progress creating naval aviation within the interwar interval due to leaders like Admirals Joseph Reeves, William Moffett, and William Sims. They innovated with plane and ship designs, modified the personnel and coaching techniques, and developed a brand new manner of combating. When a mission got here alongside that required provider aviation—the Pacific theater in World Conflict II—the Navy was prepared due to their pioneering work.
OPNAV continues that custom of progressive and daring management at this time. Each time they resolve it’s time to evolve the fleet, they are going to absolutely face a frightening problem. Nevertheless, whether or not or not we predict we can transition away from the carrier-centric fleet, I imagine the proof is more and more clear that we want to.
CDR Jeff Vandenengel is a naval officer with excursions on three fast-attack submarines. Winner of the 2019 Admiral Willis Lent Award for tactical excellence at sea, he deployed to the Western Pacific 3 times and to the Atlantic firstly of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These views are his alone and don’t essentially replicate the official coverage or place of the Division of Protection or U.S. authorities.
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of On-line Content material. Contact him at Content material@cimsec.org.
Featured Picture: ATLANTIC OCEAN (March 26, 2022) The plane provider USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) transits the Atlantic Ocean. (U.S. Navy picture by Mass Communication Specialist third Class Jackson Adkins)
